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Abstract
Where do new markets come from? I construct a network model in which
national markets are nodes and flows of recorded music between them are
links and conduct a longitudinal analysis of the global pattern of trade
in the period 1976 to 2010. I hypothesize that new export markets are
developed through a process of transitive closure in the network of inter-
national trade. When two countries’ markets experience the same social
influences, it brings them close enough together for new homophilous ties
to be formed. The implication is that consumption of foreign products
helps, not hurts, home-market producers develop overseas markets, but
only in those countries that have a history of consuming the same foreign
products that were consumed in the home market. Selling in a market
changes what is valued in that market, and new market formation is a
consequence of having social influences in common.
1 Introduction
Many innovative industries produce goods or services that have an interpreted,
or “cultural” component to the value placed on them by consumers, in that
tastes differ in different markets: just because a product is “big in Japan” does
not mean it is “big” elsewhere. The same could be said at the level of national
industries: as Figure 1 illustrates, for example, although there may be a market
for my home country’s music in Japan, there may not be one in Italy. We
are told that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, but
for information goods the more fundamental issue may be what the extent of
the market is limited by: why do only certain other countries have substantial
demand for my industry’s innovative products?
The question has substantial practical consequences. For individual pro-
ducers and distributors of information goods, selling to foreign markets can be
∗accepted for publication in Network Science
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highly profitable due to negligible marginal costs for information goods (Wild-
man and Siwek 1988, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005); for whole economies,
the presence of high-value export industries can drive overall growth and de-
velopment (Amsden, 2001; Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2007; Hidalgo et
al, 2007). Despite the importance of the question, however, received economic
theory does not provide a clear answer.
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Figure 1: Demand for interpreted goods is not uniform across countries. For
example, the composition of Italian imports of recorded music (left) is strikingly
different from the composition of Japan’s (right)
The economic viewpoint is that specialization promotes exchange, and that
specialization must be maintained to remain competitive (Ricardo, 1891, Krug-
man, 1980, 1991; Storper and Christopherson, 1987; Storper, 1992; Malmberg
and Maskell, 1997). By this logic, anything that would reduce the distinctiveness
of a country’s products would diminish its ability to export them. Accordingly,
there is some fear in certain quarters that homogenizing effects of consum-
ing imports – especially of American goods – would lessen the distinctiveness
and global profitability of many countries’ information industries (Henry, 2001;
World Trade Organization Council for Trade in Services, 1998; UNESCO, 2005;
African Union, 2005).
Is this a well-founded fear? If distinctiveness is an asset for national infor-
mation industries, is it better for them to be relatively insulated from imports?
Or is it actually better to be interconnected and influenced by the outside? The
opportunities and threats are greatest for smaller industries, in which potential
outcomes for individual producers and distributors range from entering more
lucrative foreign markets to being crowded out by global superstars. But under-
standing the dynamic effects of cross-market trade would also pose substantial
strategic questions for multi-national enterprises as well. If Warner Music wants
to expand its sales of its Belgian intellectual property in the United States, for
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example, how much of their American or British repertoire should they license
to distribute on online music streaming services in Belgium? Would too much
outside influence dilute or diminish the distinctive ’Belgianness’ and lessen the
export value of Belgian repertoire? Or, on the contrary, would such influence
make the music more familiar and valuable to new markets abroad? More gen-
erally, where do new markets for interpreted information goods come from?
Although mainstream economic thought does not present a clear answer, the
very term ’cultural good’ suggests an alternative framing. Cultural goods are
’cultural’ in that they derive their value from subjective, but socially contingent,
meanings. The export of cultural goods from one country to another can be
seen as a form of international communication, in which the goods are the
messages. The meanings and value of cultural goods (as with any messages) are
not universal or intrinsic, but depend instead on the language or expectations
of the message’s recipients for interpretation.
Therefore, I view this not as a problem of the functioning of a market, but
rather as a macroscopic network constituted by semiotically valent exchanges.
In the model I propose, national markets are nodes and flows of information
goods between them are links. I conduct a longitudinal network analysis of the
global pattern of trade in a specific information industry — recorded music —
in the period 1976 to 2010.
Using this framing, the following sections develop and test the hypothesis
that new export markets are developed through a process of transitive closure in
the network of international trade. When two countries’ markets experience the
same social influences, it brings them close enough together for new homophilous
ties to be formed. In other words, consumption of foreign products at home
helps, not hurts, home-market producers to enter new foreign markets, with the
caveat that it only helps them enter markets that have a history of consuming
the same foreign products that were consumed in the home market. Selling in
a market changes what is valued in that market, and new market development
can be seen as a consequence of having social influences in common.
2 Social influence in inter-market trade
In general, it is believed that people are more “homogenous within than between
groups” (Burt 2004), and that explanations for this pattern can be grouped
into two broad types: homophily and social influence (c.f. Aral, Muchnik, and
Sundararajan, 2009). These two explanations are not mutually exclusive, but
explain complementary phenomena. Homophily is the tendency for individuals
to form ties with others like themselves. Social influence, on the other hand,
suggests that connected individuals will become more alike. Both have salient
interpretations in the present context. A tie suggests that the products of the
exporting country are intelligible enough to consumers in the importing country
to support a relatively high volume of trade. Indeed, by the very act of mod-
eling international trade as a network of meaningful exchange ties, homophily
is assumed by construction. In seeking to understand how the pattern of trade
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changes over time, however, we are interested in the role that social influence
plays in concert with homophily.
Importantly, in the context of music trade, the primary vehicle for influence is
the music recording, rather than interpersonal contact with individuals in other
countries. Music is a form of symbolic communication, so the export of music
from one country to another amounts to a sort of macroscopic communication
tie. Although music listeners in the importing country typically do not directly
interact with music listeners in the exporting country, they are on the receiving
end of communicative exchange, and may be influenced by listening to a subset
of the exporting country’s music.
Messages transmitted from one person to another in the process of communi-
cation, whether linguistic or non-linguistic, have no intrinsic meaning but must
be interpreted as corresponding to meanings by their recipients (e.g. Maines
1977, Lakoff 1987, Carlile, 2002). The sounds that make up a word in one
language may be nonsense in another language, for example. There is a require-
ment, therefore, for a learned interpretive layer — a sort of semantic knowledge
that is an aspect of language — that maps messages to meanings: a ’tacit knowl-
edge’ (Polanyi 1966, Polanyi and Prosch 1977) or absorptive capacity (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990) on the demand side.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical repertoire of music. If musical phrases
in this body of work conventionally end in a certain way, a songwriter could
play with the listener’s learned expectation that a specific phrase will end the
same way. For example, by withholding the expected harmony and prolonging
the penultimate chord, one might increase the dramatic tension. A piece of
music that includes this technique depends for effect in part on the listener
expecting the final harmony, only to have that expectation manipulated by the
withholding of that harmony. If such music were brought to listeners from
a different country who did not “speak the same musical language,” a long
penultimate chord would not have any particular meaning because there would
be no expectation in mind of what was supposed to happen. Therefore a musical
innovation - in this case the displacement of the expected harmony in time - does
not create an increase in quality by creating objectively better combinations of
musical elements, but rather depends on the listener’s expectations to achieve
an effect. Over time, new and innovative music, in turn, becomes a reference
point for composition and consumption of future music. To continue with the
example of the withheld harmony, if it were used and heard enough, it could
eventually become a conventional element in a phrase ending, and its effect on
listeners would not in that case include surprise or increased tension.
This is not to say that every individual would have the same reaction; peo-
ple respond to music differently. In the case of the withheld harmony, though
everyone may have learned to expect the same conventional phrase endings,
some subset of the population may prefer those expectations to be met. These
individuals would favor a more conventional style, while others may enjoy the
innovation. Although their tastes differ, the fact that they share that reference
point means that each other’s preferred music is nonetheless mutually intelli-
gible. To people in other markets who are not familiar with the conventional
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phrase endings, there would be no difference in effect if the final harmony was
withheld or not.
Looking at music through this lens, what exposure to the same music would
provide, therefore, is not a predictable influence on tastes that pertains to all
listeners, but rather a common reference point, to which people may relate
differently. To the degree that words are used in shared experiential contexts,
they should contribute to establishing shared meanings among the people that
use them to communicate. However, to the extent that contexts and associations
differ, the meanings associated with words will tend to diverge. This suggests
that shared meaning – and perhaps shared value – is possible only to the extent
that the communicators have shared experience. In summary, I have argued
thus far that being exposed to music in common is a precondition for sharing
aspects of a “musical language,” which is to say the set of expectations through
which new music is understood and evaluated.
2.1 Economic literature
The economic literature has not focused on trade in cultural goods, but does
nonetheless include several important, if peripheral, treatments of the topic.
These contributions do not constitute a coherent perspective, but can be inte-
grated by interpretation through the above framework and deserve consideration
here.
Linder (1961) suggested that trade propensities among countries should be
understood as forming a matrix, representing the degree to which they produced
products appropriate to each other’s aggregate tastes. In more recent studies of
trade in cultural goods, a minority but significant perspective on the difficulty
in developing new export markets revolves around empirical evidence for the
idea of a “cultural discount,” goods from abroad are not valued as highly as
domestic goods (Hoskins, Mirus, and Rozeboom 1989; Huang, 2007; Lee, 2006;
Park, 2006; Rauch and Trindade, 2009). These findings are entirely consistent
with Linder’s hypothesis: tastes differ, and they are generally thought to be
related to a variety of factors more or less exogenous to the phenomenon of
trade itself.
Others, especially Schulze (1999), go on to consider how tastes change, and
how trade might itself affect tastes. One factor in changing tastes is a variety of
network externality, in that consumers are thought to derive more value out of
listening to music, the more people they have to share the experience with (c.f.
Salganik, Dodds, and Watts 2006, Salganik and Watts 2009, who describe a
short-run version of a similar phenomenon in terms of social influence). Schultz
(1999) uses the term “consumption capital” to describe tastes formed through
experience, explaining that “eventually, the reinforcing effect of consumption
capital accumulation makes it a part of the national culture. This implies that
trade in art should be a positive function of cultural proximity and that current
trade is a positive function of past trade.”
Witt (2001) expresses a similar argument in evolutionary terms: what has
been consumed in the past conditions what is valued and consumed in the
5
Figure 2: A co-evolutionary cycle between the characteristics of products and
the preferences of consumers within a single market.
future. The conditioning is by means of the associations that the mind draws
consciously or subconsciously between the old and the new. For higher-level
and specific manifestations of wants (that is, those that are not innate such
as food and shelter), it is by these “learned associations” that tastes become
specific to certain products and types of products. As tastes are conditioned by
consumption they in turn make up the selection mechanism by which products
gain in prominence and ability to further influence tastes (Figure 2).
These minority perspectives in economic theory are clearly congruent with
the reading of the sociologies of communication I advance above. The task of
the following section is to convert this perspective into a testable hypothesis.
2.2 Hypothesis
If importing music influences the local musical language, how should we expect
this to alter the observed pattern of trade? The most obvious implication would
be toward a pattern of reciprocal trade. If country A influences country B’s mu-
sical language by exporting to it, the most obvious new market for country B’s
new output would be country A, because the two countries would have refer-
ence points in common. Empirically, such a tendency to reciprocating trade
ties would not be possible to attribute to the social influence-based mechanism
I propose: reciprocal trade could be explained by homophily alone (which, as
noted above, we assume must be present) or other dyadic latent variable with-
out reference to social influence. Latent variables are always problematic in
empirical work, but they are a particular concern here. If we start with a pair
of countries that trade with each other, we know that they are already similar
enough to support one homophilous tie, and there would be no need to invoke
social influence in explaining why a second, reciprocated tie would be formed. I
suggest that looking beyond bilateral relationships would lessen these empirical
difficulties, and that rather than look for exports back to the original exporter,
we should look for exports to other countries that were also influenced by the
original exporter (Figure 3).
To illustrate, consider a simple invented example. Imagine some country
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Figure 3: Hypothesized transitive closure due to social influence in common
like the United States exports music to two other countries, say, Thailand and
Nigeria. Some Thai producers and some Nigerian producers will be influenced
by imports from the US, and some will not. However, assuming that a large
proportion of consumers in those countries have consumed American music,
we can expect the local musical language to be influenced by American music.
If this process is happening in both Nigeria and Thailand simultaneously, we
would expect their domestic musical output to be more intelligible to each other
in the aggregate than before the influence of the United States. Given such an
influence in common, we would therefore expect a subset of producers in Nigeria
to have an easier time selling their products to Thai consumers (and vice versa)
because of these shared reference points. If consumer tastes are also influenced
by imports, in other words, then there should be an increased likelihood not
just of exporting after importing, but of exporting to certain countries that
have common international influences from trade.
In the three country case, there are initially trade flows A → B and A →
C, but no trade flows between B and C. There is therefore no prior evidence
from the presence of trade that B and C have a high propensity to trade with
each other, so a new trade flow B → C or C → B could be considered a more
meaningful finding. There is admittedly still a selection bias, because B and C
both import from A, but since it is more indirect, it can be assumed to be lesser
than the selection bias inherent in looking for reciprocal trade. The tri-lateral
approach is also advantageous in regard to effective sample size. If, say, the
United States exported to n=30 countries, there are 30 possible reciprocal trade
flows one could look for, but n!/(2!(n- 2)!) = 435 cases of triadic closure we
could look for, raising our power in controlling for exogenous variables.
In sum, I argue that for information goods with an interpreted component,
the more two countries have imported from the same international sources, the
more likely one is to begin to export to the other. I therefore test the hypothesis
that the pattern of trade in music evolves through a process of transitive closure,
or more precisely,
hypothesis New markets for a country’s music are more likely, the more
transitive mediated triads the new trade relationship would complete.
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3 Data and methods
3.1 Data
The hypothesis of this paper must be tested with longitudinal data. Records of
exports and imports are extracted from the United Nations Commodity Trade
Database (COMTRADE 2012a). I use data classified under Standard Interna-
tional Trade Code Revision 2, commodity number 89832 (sound recordings),
which includes pre-recorded physical sound carrying media of any form. CDs,
cassettes, phonograph records, and mini-discs are all included in this category,
and blank media and computer software are not. For these data, the value of
an export flow is reported by each exporting country in United States dollars
in “free on board” terms, which includes costs of the exported goods and the
costs incurred in getting them to the country’s border, but excludes shipping
and insurance costs incurred in transporting them to the destination country.
Data availability begins in 1976, with 18 countries reporting exports to specific
destinations. There is a gradually increasing trend in the number of countries
reporting the destination of their exports until it reaches a maximum in 2005
and 2006 at 150 countries reporting.
Some pre-processing of data is required. Most notably, export data from
Taiwan is not available for political reasons. However, it is possible to approxi-
mate these data by examining other countries’ reports of imports from “Other
Asia, nes,” which is a term reserved in practice for Taiwan. Some trade flows
are reported with other indefinite partner designations (for example, “World,”
or “Areas, nes”) but unlike “Other Asia, nes,” these do not indicate a defi-
nite destination (COMTRADE 2012b, 2012c). I therefore do not include these
indefinite data in the present study.
Because my hypothesis is intended to test the idea that imports of music
affect the music that is created within a country, we must exclude goods that
merely pass through a country on their way somewhere else. It is therefore
necessary to subtract re-exports from total exports to arrive at a figure for net
exports of music recordings produced domestically (note that being produced
domestically does not necessarily imply that the music was originally composed
domestically). Other authors have tended to prefer to use imports, rather than
exports as the source of data on trade flows for reasons of their greater accuracy,
but this approach would not have allowed the subtraction of re-exports, which
is the more significant distortion of the data for my purposes.
The hypothesis is concerned with new trade flows, but we only wish to focus
on economically meaningful ones. It is therefore necessary to dichotomize the
data to represent when a trade flow crosses over some significant threshold from
being ’absent’ to being ’present.’ The method used to dichotomize the data
could substantially affect the results of statistical models run on this data. I
therefore repeat the analyses on multiple versions of the binarized data. The
primary approach to dichotomization attempts to code a trade flow as present
(a “1”), if it is large relative to the market of the importing country. Simply
because of the difference in sizes, one million dollars’ worth of exports to the
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United States would certainly be much less influential on the local language
than the same amount of music exported to say, Belgium, or Malawi.
To establish a suitable means of comparison, I first took available data on
music market sizes (dollars spent by consumers) from the International Feder-
ation of the Phonograph Industry (IFPI 1992, 1998, 1999, 2005) and regressed
them on population and GDP (with all variables log-transformed) (Table 1).
These variables had good predictive power (R2 of .89) and allow for reason-
able approximation of music market sizes for the many countries that do not
report data through the IFPI but do report population and GDP statistics. I
then chose a threshold, a, such that if the value of the trade flow was greater
than a% of the predicted size of the importing country’s music market, the flow
would be coded as “1,” and “0” otherwise. To confirm that results were not
dependent on the value of a, I repeated the analyses, varying a from 1% to 35%
of the estimated size of importing music market. These results are presented in
Table 7, in the following section.
Table 1: Size of domestic market
Full sample Top 5 mkts omitted
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept -15.99 < 0.001 -15.464 < 0.001
ln GDP/capita 1.23 < 0.001 1.200 < 0.001
ln population 0.988 < 0.001 0.959 < 0.001
N 47 42
Adj. R sq. 0.935 0.893
In an additional series of analyses, rather than consider the relative size of
trade flows, I used a dichotomization scheme based on absolute sizes. For these
runs, I used the following algorithm. Starting with the largest reported flow by
dollar value and proceeding from largest to smallest, trade flows are coded as
present (as a 1), until the sum of their dollar value equals 95% of the total global
dollar value of reported trade. The thousands of the smallest trade flows that
together sum to less than five percent of total reported world trade in recorded
music, are thus coded as absent (as 0).
For each data year, I represent my trade data in a square matrix, representing
all possible origin-destination pairs of countries as row-column entries. Each
country is represented as a row (as the exporting country) and as a column
(the importing country). These matrices taken together can be viewed as a
representation of the phenomenon to be explained: the evolving network of
trade in music.
Starting with all available COMTRADE data, any country that was coded
as importing or exporting in any of the data years is considered part of the study
population of countries for all of years in a given set of analyses. That is, the set
of countries under consideration is constant across time, and omits all countries
that do not report trade in music at a high level (as defined by the inclusion
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algorithms described above) during the study period. One exception to this
generalization is that a number of countries were divided into several smaller
countries during the study period, such as Yugoslavia. In this case, I treat
the largest (by population) “child” country (i.e. Serbia) as if it were the same
country as the “parent” (Yugoslavia). The smaller “children” (e.g. Croatia) are
left out of statistical estimations until they become independent states by coding
their entire row and column of the trade matrices with “structural zeros”. These
encode an absent trade flow that is absent for exogenous reasons (in this case,
because the country did not exist), and are not considered by the statistical
model (see Ripley, Snijders, and Preciado 2011 for more detail). The other
exception is Germany, which unified the former East and West Germanies. In
this case, I treat West Germany and unified Germany as one country and East
Germany as if it could no longer trade for exogenous reasons (with structural
zeros).
If we wish to study when one country is likely to begin to export to the
other, then this is to say that we are particularly interested in the formation
of trade flows — the change from 0s to 1s in the set of matrices representing
the changing pattern of trade. To evaluate what conditions are associated with
the changes from 0s to 1s, we must also take into account those 0s that remain
0s. The absence of a trade flow between a given pair of countries in the study
population provides information for empirical analysis, just as the presence of a
trade flow does. In this study, therefore, each entry in the matrices representing
trade in music corresponds to one observation in the dependent variable.
Digital delivery of music recordings has, of course, been a major disruptive
force in the music industry. The IFPI reports that in 2006, digital music con-
sumption amounted to only 10% of total sales in the United States. Although
growing rapidly, it had not yet become the overwhelming influence it is today
during the study period. On the other hand, the effect of illegally copied and
shared music on the volume of legitimate international trade up through 2006
is not known. After dichotomizing the data, it does not appear to have had a
dramatic effect, in that the number of trade ties continues to rise over time, even
through the 2001 and 2006 data years (see Table 3). To confirm that there was
no substantial effect on the model proposed and tested here, I run an additional
model excluding those final two observation years, and compare to the full data
set.
3.2 Non-parametric analyses
In addition to the multivariate analyses, discussed below, I present results for
non-parametric comparisons of the association between amount of common in-
fluence and changes to the trade network. For each observation except the first
(before which there is no observed history), each potential ordered pair of coun-
tries is placed into one of four categories. One category of ordered pairs has ties
that have been maintained from the previous period (“maintained ties”). The
second is ties that were present in the previous period but absent in the current
period (“lost ties”). The third is “new ties,” and the fourth is ties that are not
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present in the current or previous time periods (“no ties”).
For each matrix entry in each category, I step backwards from the observation
and count the number of previous observation years in which common influences
were experienced by the two countries. In addition to descriptive statistics for
each category, I employ a discrete two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests
to examine whether the distribution of common influences varies by category.
The two-sample KS test is a non-parametric test for differences between the
cumulative distribution functions of empirical data, especially useful when the
underlying distributions are not known a priori (Massey 1951).
3.3 Exogenous variables for multivariate models
The empirical benchmark in describing international trade is the so-called “grav-
ity model” (e.g. Anderson 1979), and I look to this tradition as a starting point
for inclusion of exogenous explanatory variables. The gravity model shows that
the level of trade between two countries is proportional to the product of their
GDPs (analogous to the interaction of their economic ’masses’) and the inverse
square of the geographic distance between them. In cultural industries specif-
ically, there are economic arguments that the size of the exporter’s market is
most important in determining the pattern of trade (Wildman and Siwek 1988,
Dupagne and Waterman 1998, Lee and Waterman 2007). I therefore represent
the market sizes separately for the exporter (aka “ego”) and the importer (“al-
ter”). In the multivariate analyses below, the effect of the covariates enters
multiplicatively, so there is no substantial difference between this and the origi-
nal gravity model. The gravity model literature also typically includes variables
for the geographic contiguity of pairs of countries, whether they have a history
of a colonial relationship together, and whether they share a spoken language.
I follow this precedent and include variables for contiguity, direct colonial tie
(country A colonized country B), and indirect colonial tie (countries A and B
were both colonized by country C), and whether greater than 9% of the popula-
tion of each pair of countries shares a common language. Data for commonality
of language, geodesic distance, contiguity, and colonial relationship are taken
from the CEPII database of international trade statistics, available online at
www.cepii.fr. Descriptive statistics for covariates and dichotomous trade net-
works are in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
3.4 Hypothesized interdependence of observations
I am hypothesizing an effect of the existence of certain trade flows on other trade
flows. Of course, we must also explain the presence or absence of the first trade
flows as well, which will be explained (in part) by the presence or absence of
still other trade flows, and so on. This sort of endogenous causation (trade flows
depend on trade flows), implies that each observed trade flow should play dual
roles in the analysis. As an import, it is a causal factor relevant to the importing
country’s future exports. As an export from the originating country, it is itself
an outcome to be explained. The observations in the dependent variable are, by
11
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for covariates
Min. 1st Qrt. Median Mean 3rd Qrt. Max. Variance unit
ln(distance) 4.09 8.43 8.96 8.77 9.33 9.90 0.65 Kilometers
Colony 0 0 0 0.01 0 1 0.01 indicator
contiguous 0 0 0 0.02 0 1 0.02 indicator
common language 0 0 0 0.15 0 1 0.13 indicator
common colonizer 0 0 0 0.11 0 1 0.10 indicator
Music market 1976 1.25 6.39 8.06 8.36 10.37 15.35 7.33 US$ (2005)
Music market 1981 1.52 6.66 8.40 8.57 10.63 15.52 7.26 US$ (2005)
Music market 1986 1.81 6.70 8.49 8.71 10.76 15.72 7.18 US$ (2005)
Music market 1991 2.21 7.09 8.68 8.91 10.82 15.86 6.60 US$ (2005)
Music market 1996 2.67 7.13 8.83 9.04 11.05 16.04 6.71 US$ (2005)
Music market 2001 2.97 7.40 9.04 9.25 11.18 16.26 6.60 US$ (2005)
Music market 2006 3.57 7.67 9.43 9.52 11.46 16.41 6.58 US$ (2005)
Table 3: Network descriptive statistics by year
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
at 1% threshold
number of ties 12 259 335 631 988 1125 1351
max outdegree 3 63 71 105 128 142 136
# with OD=1 5 11 11 8 18 24 12
# with OD=0 182 158 150 136 111 97 100
at 5% threshold
number of ties 2 93 115 261 413 472 611
max outdegree 1 25 32 60 80 79 81
# with OD=1 2 10 13 16 15 22 20
# with OD=0 188 170 165 151 137 123 119
Note: “OD” is an abbreviation for “outdegree”
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hypothesis, interdependent. Interdependence of this sort is a clear violation of
the independence assumptions of standard multivariate statistical models, but
is the bread and butter of network models, in which it is known as a “structural
effect,” in that the structure of the network endogenously influences its own
subsequent structure.
3.4.1 Competing hypotheses
Conceptually intertwined with the main hypothesis are at least three other
phenomena of interdependency. Each of these is predicted to be correlated with
the transitive mediated triads of the main hypothesis, above. These therefore
act as competing hypotheses, in that they could theoretically explain observed
transitive closure.
The first is the tendency toward reciprocity of already existing trade ties, as
discussed above. A correlation between reciprocity and transitivity could arise
in a dense area of the network. Thus reciprocity must be controlled for.
The second phenomenon is having a common colonizer (mentioned in “ex-
ogenous variables,” above). If two countries were colonized by the same third
country, it would not be surprising if they traded at an above average level
with their colonizer and each other, thus creating triads. These triads might
be due to a similar process of influence to that in the main hypothesis (if the
colonizer’s music influenced both importing countries), but it could also be due
to completely unrelated factors. For example, such countries could have shared
legal systems that support trade, a history of bilateral shipping instituted by
the colonizer, or other factors in common.
The third phenomenon is one that has been observed in international trade
in differentiated industries in general: the tendency for major exporters to trade
disproportionately with each other. In the “new” trade theory (Krugman, 1980),
countries that have successfully specialized in a variety or varieties of goods
within an industry are likely export to many partner countries, selling their
domestic products, as well as import from many partner countries, who make
complementary products. The result is the tendency for countries with many
export markets to be each other’s trading partners to a greater degree than
would be predicted by the numbers of their trading partners alone. In the
language of network analysis, the number of outgoing links is known as “out-
degree” and this sorting of countries within a network by the number of outgoing
links is known as out-degree assortativity (hereafter “assortativity” for brevity).
Where a few countries have disproportionately many outgoing trade ties, and
they disproportionately trade with each other, this could appear statistically
like the effect of a transitive process, even if transitivity played no role in the
actual formation or dissolution of ties. Literature on network dynamics suggests
that assortativity and transitivity are not just difficult to distinguish, but may in
fact limit the values the other can take (Serrano and Bogun˜a´, 2005; Holme and
Zhao, 2007). The presence of a bounded range of possible transitivity confirms
that even without a true tendency to transitivity, an assortativity effect can
itself produce a considerable amount of incidental transitivity. Over time, both
13
degree assortativity and transitivity can lead to a similar clustered pattern of
ties in the network. However, the two effects are constituted by different micro-
processes. To rule out this alternative explanation of observed transitive closure,
rather than include both transitivity and assortativity effects (in which case,
analogous to other multicollinearity problems, it would be difficult to determine
which structural effect was responsible for the observed pattern of ties), I run
analyses with finer-grained (yearly) data that include an assortativity parameter
but no transitivity parameter, testing if such a specification could account for
the data.
3.5 The Siena framework
The presence of endogenous structural effects in a model of network evolution
mean that the status of each trade tie depends (in multiple ways) on the sta-
tus of each other trade tie. Finding parameter estimates and evaluating their
statistical significance analytically (analogous to fitting a least-squares line al-
gebraically, for example) is simply not feasible for this type of data. Snijders
and colleagues (2001, 2005, Snijders et al. 2007, Ripley, Snijders, and Preci-
ado 2011) therefore elaborated a Markov Chain Monte Carlo type computer
simulation method of arriving at maximum likelihood parameter estimates and
standard errors. Snijders’ longitudinal model of network evolution is known as
the “Siena” model, which stands for “Simulation Investigation for Empirical
Network Analysis,” now available as the package “RSiena” for the R statistical
computing environment.
3.5.1 Model Basics
To convey the nature of the analytical method used in this research, I present a
simplified description of the Siena model here; for a more complete and detailed
description, the reader is referred to the original sources (Snijders, 2001, 2005;
Snijders et al. 2007; Ripley, Snijders, and Preciado 2011). In Siena, the actual
set of changes to the structure of the observed network – in this case, changes
in who exports to whom – is considered the outcome of stochastic process,
which is to be modeled. Other changes to the network could have resulted from
the same underlying forces making up the stochastic process, but the modeling
effort seeks parameter values that make the observed data more likely than any
other combination of parameter values (thus “maximum likelihood”). Let us
denote the current state of the network as x, drawn from a distribution of such
networks, X, where xijt = 1 when country i exports to country j at time t and
xijt = 0 otherwise. The probability that the network changes from one state
to another, p(Xt = xt|Xt−1 = xt−1) is a function of the sum of the influences
from the effects in the model. The observed data are characterized in terms
of “change statistics,” skt, where t indicates the period and k denotes which
statistic is being counted, for example the number of newly reciprocated trade
ties or the number of newly completed transitive mediated triads.
The formation or dissolution of each trade tie can influence multiple change
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statistics simultaneously – for example a new tie could be both a newly reciprocal
tie and complete a transitive mediated triad. In the model, these statistics are
multiplied by parameters βk that represent the contribution of the structure in
question to the likelihood of forming a tie. At a high level, the model states that
the tendency for the network X to take on a certain form, x can be described
in terms of an objective function evaluated from the point of view of nodes,
i, and depends to various extents, βk, on the change in the number of certain
structures, ski in x:
fi(β, x) =
∑
k
βkski(x).
Note that time is modeled If there is a “true” tendency toward the completion
of transitive mediated triads (TMTs), above and beyond the amount that they
appear as a by-product of other effects in the model, then the parameter for
this effect, βTMT should be significantly greater than zero, and the network is
more likely to evolve by adding these triads than otherwise.
3.5.2 Estimation algorithm
To estimate model parameters Siena uses an iterative process of simulating net-
works based on the current parameter values, comparing the simulated networks
to the observed data, and then updating the parameter values until model con-
vergence is achieved.
Starting from initial parameter values, βˆk, the algorithm simulates changes
to the network over time and calculates the change statistics in the simulated
networks (i.e. how many reciprocated ties or transitive mediated triads were
formed in the simulations over the t periods) – call these ssimkt . These are then
compared with the actual change statistics observed from the empirical data,
sobskt . The values of βˆk are then incremented or decremented and more simu-
lations are conducted. This process of simulation, comparison, and parameter
update is repeated until the simulated evolution of the network looks like the
observed evolution of the network, or
E[ssimkt |βˆk] = sobskt .
3.5.3 Definitions of change statistics
The basic definitions for the change statistics for the structural variables are as
follows. The transitive mediated triads change statistic is equal to
n∑
h=1
(xt,h,i)(xt,h,j)−
n∑
h=1
(xt−1,h,i)(xt−1,h,j)
for h 6= i 6= j. For reciprocity, the change statistic is
xt,j,i − xt−1,j,i
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and for out-degree assortativity, it is
(
n∑
h=1
(xt,i,k))(
n∑
h=1
(xt,j,k))− (
n∑
h=1
(xt−1,i,k))(
n∑
h=1
(xt−1,j,k))
for h 6= i 6= j. In addition to these basic definitions, there are also versions that
separately measure the formation of ties and the maintenance of existing ties
(see Ripley, Snijders, and Preciado 2011 for definitions).
4 Results
Non-parametric tests for a tendency toward triadic closure are positive, and in
multivariate analyses the parameter for transitive mediated triads is positive
and significant in all of its forms. The main hypothesis of this paper is therefore
supported. The pattern of trade evolves through a process of transitive closure:
new markets for a country’s music are more likely, the more transitive mediated
triads the new trade relationship would complete. More detailed results are
presented, below.
4.1 Non-parametric comparisons
Two sets of unconditional comparisons were performed (Table 4). The first
compares all ordered pairs of countries at all time points that are not connected
by a trade tie. Within these, I compare the set that go on to form a trade tie
to the set that remains without a tie in the next observation. The other set
considers ordered country pairs that are tied and compares those that lose that
tie to those that maintain it in the next observation.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests show that the sets that had ties at the second
observation (those that created a new tie or maintained a tie) had experienced
significantly more social influence in common than those that did not have ties at
the second observation (those that lost ties or which maintained a lack of tie).
The only comparison that was not statistically significant was the length of
individual influences held in common (as opposed to the total of all influences
or the number of influences) at the 5% threshold for tie inclusion. All other
comparisons at both the 1% and 5% thresholds were significant at the p < 0.001
level. Pairs of countries that formed ties or maintained ties had more social
influence in common than pairs of countries that lost or did not form ties.
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 also give a sense of the time scale at
work. Broadly speaking, social influence can be seen to operate after one or
two observations (between 5 and 10 years) on average. Those that formed ties
had on average 10 years of common influence, which would be equivalent to two
sources of common influence for one observation period, or one source for two.
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Table 4: Non-parametric comparisons of common history by tie category
1% threshold
maintained ties lost ties new ties no ties
Descriptive statistics
mean total common influence (years) 20 15.9 10.6 4.1
mean duration of a common influence 8.8 8.8 8.2 7.8
mean number of common influences 2.3 1.8 1.3 0.5
n observed 4484 2216 4884 365756
K.S. test statistics and p-values
total influence 0.06, p < 0.0001 0.14, p < 0.0001
length of single influences in common 0.03, p < 0.0001 0.06, p < 0.0001
number of influences in common 0.07, p < 0.0001 0.14, p < 0.0001
5% threshold
maintained ties lost ties new ties no ties
Descriptive statistics
mean total common influence (years) 6.3 4.6 3.4 1
mean duration of a common influence 8.1 8 7.6 7.2
mean number of common influences 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.1
n observed 1742 970 2184 372444
K.S. test statistics and p-values
total influence 0.05, p < 0.001 0.12, p < 0.001
length of single influences in common 0.03, p = 0.200 0.08, p < 0.001
number of influences in common 0.06, p < 0.001 0.12, p < 0.001
Note: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is the maximum vertical difference between
the empirical cumulative distribution functions. The p-value is the probability that the two
samples are drawn from the same population. Comparisons are made between maintained
and lost ties and between new ties and no ties.
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4.2 Multivariate models
Reported parameter estimates from the multivariate Siena models can be un-
derstood as log odds ratios that weight the contribution of the covariate that
they modify to the probability that a trade tie exists. The magnitude of an
effect on the probability of a tie attributable to a difference in covariate values
is eβˆ(∆sk), where ∆sk denotes the difference in covariates, and βˆ the estimated
parameter. For example, if we wanted to compare the difference in tie probabil-
ity between contiguous and non-contiguous countries (a dummy variable), ∆sk
would be 1, and the effect magnitude would be eβˆ . If we wanted to compare
how much more likely a tie was to originate between countries one standard
deviation closer than the mean distance between all countries, we would plug in
-0.804 (minus one standard deviation (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics)) for
∆sk. As such, the size of the effect depends on the range and variability of each
individual variable, as well as the estimated parameter. Parameters cannot be
directly compared to those estimated for other variables without reference to
covariate values.
The main results for this study are presented in Table 5. This series of mod-
els is estimated from observations taken at 5 year intervals from 1976 to 2006.
The first column represents the basic model, with all variables parametrized
in the “evaluation” form. The evaluation form means that parameters weight
the importance of the covariates in contributing to the presence of a trade tie,
without distinguishing between new ties and existing ties. The second model
divides each variable into “creation” (tendency to form new ties) and “endow-
ment” (tendency to maintain existing ties) parametrization. When the absolute
value of the parameter estimate is more than twice the standard error, the
parameter can be considered significant at the p < 0.05 level.
To give a sense of the importance of the main result, Table 6 shows calculated
effect magnitudes for different combinations of geographic distance and number
of common influences. This comparison shows that a single common influence
is estimated to have a greater positive correlation with the probability of a new
exporting relationship than would a hypothetical change in geographic distance
of one standard deviation on the log scale.
Unlike the other variables in the model, the parameter for common influences
(transitive mediated triads) may enter multiplicatively if there is more than one
common influence. Each common influence multiplies the odds of tie formation
by about 1.39. So, two influences in common would mean the odds of new ties
is 1.392, and three influences means that new ties are 1.393 times more likely
than without any influences in common. Considering the observed numbers of
influences in common, this could represent a very large effect. For example,
in these data more than 800 ordered country pairs had 8 or more common
influences, representing an increase in new tie probability of at least 13.9 times
the set of countries with no influences in common (see Table 6).
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Table 5: Models estimated from 1976-2006 data, observations taken at five year
intervals
est. s.e. est. s.e.
outdegree (density) -5.01 0.08 -5.50 0.09
reciprocity 0.18 0.06
endowment 2.09 0.25
creation -0.29 0.13
transitive med triads 0.26 0.01
endowment 0.11 0.04
creation 0.33 0.03
ln(distance) -0.47 0.02
endowment -0.73 0.07
creation -0.31 0.04
colonial tie (direct) 0.58 0.06
endowment 0.35 0.21
creation 0.67 0.14
contiguous 0.28 0.06
endowment 0.55 0.23
creation 0.25 0.12
common language 0.76 0.04
endowment 2.01 0.14
creation 0.00 0.08
common colonizer 0.26 0.07
endowment 2.57 0.28
creation -0.83 0.16
music market alter -0.02 0.01
endowment 0.05 0.03
creation -0.06 0.02
music market ego 0.62 0.01
endowment -1.29 0.05
creation 2.71 0.07
rate 1976-1981 30.92 4.43 50.10 7.13
rate 1981-1986 10.73 1.18 17.61 2.02
rate 1986-1991 43.91 4.97 68.54 7.68
rate 1991-1996 39.66 3.15 56.90 4.54
rate 1996-2001 27.10 1.60 37.42 2.44
rate 2001-2006 23.99 1.33 32.43 1.98
Note: ties coded as present at the 1% threshold
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Table 6: Magnitude of common influence effect
distance (miles) Number of common influences
0 1 2 3 4
12456 (max) 0.70 0.98 1.36 1.89 2.63
8866 (+1 sd) 0.78 1.08 1.51 2.10 2.92
3983 (mean) 1 1.39 1.93 2.69 3.74
1790 (-1 sd) 1.28 1.78 2.48 3.45 4.80
804 (-2 sd) 1.64 2.28 3.18 4.42 6.15
37 (min) 4.27 5.93 8.25 11.48 15.97
Notes: Indications such as (+1 sd) refer to an increase of
one standard deviation on the log scale. Table entries are
odds of a new tie being created, relative to countries with
no common influences and countries 3983 miles apart (the
mean of the distance variable on the log scale).
4.2.1 Additional Results
Plugging parameter estimates into eβˆ(∆sk) to get effect magnitudes (see begin-
ning of section 4.2, above), other factors in the formation of new ties are as
follows. New ties that reciprocate existing ties are only 75% as likely as non-
reciprocal ties, ruling out reciprocity as a competing explanation for the finding
of a tendency to transitivity. Geographic distance is associated with fewer new
ties; countries that are a single standard less distant on the log scale are 1.28
times more likely to form a trade tie. Contiguous countries are an additional
1.28 times more likely to form a tie than non-contiguous countries. Unsurpris-
ingly, a past direct colonial relationship makes a new tie almost twice as likely as
otherwise, but interestingly, countries that were colonized by the same colonizer
were less than half as likely (44%) to form new ties than those that did not
share a colonizer. This rules out the competing hypothesis of common coloniz-
ers for explanation of new ties that complete triadic structures in the pattern
of trade. The effect with the greatest magnitude was the estimated size of the
music market: doubling the size of a music market multiplies the probability of
creating a new outgoing tie by more than 6.5. There was a very slight decrease
in the probability of exporting to countries with larger music markets. Doubling
market size of the destination country is associated with a reduction of new tie
probability by about 4%.
The correlates of the maintenance of existing ties are somewhat different. Re-
ciprocal ties are about 8 times more likely to be maintained than non-reciprocal
ties. Each common influence multiplies the odds of tie maintenance by about
1.11 (a much smaller effect than in tie formation). For geographic distance,
a single standard deviation on the log scale has a greater effect for maintain-
ing ties — about 1.44 times more likely for more proximate countries, with an
additional 1.73 times the probability of maintaining ties for contiguous coun-
tries. A direct colonial tie makes maintaining ties about 1.42 times as likely,
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Table 7: Effect of tie-inclusion threshold on transitivity parameter estimate
Threshold
1% 5% 9% 13% 17% 21% 35% 29% 33%
Estimate 0.26 0.50 0.68 0.73 0.92 1.08 1.43 1.43 1.66
Standard error 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.39
Note: the tie inclusion threshold is the percentage of the estimated size of a
music market above which an incoming tie is coded as 1 and below which, 0.
but countries that were colonized by the same colonizer are more than 13 times
more likely to maintain their existing music trade. Having a language in com-
mon had no significant correlation with the creation of ties, but it is associated
with maintaining existing ties around 7.4 times more of the time. In contrast
to tie formation, countries with larger music markets were much less likely to
maintain their ties. Doubling music market size was associated with ties being
maintained 58% less of the time.
4.3 Robustness checks
4.3.1 Threshold for tie inclusion
In addition to the results already presented, I conducted many robustness
checks.
I varied the threshold used to code a trade flow as present or absent from
1% to 33% of the importing country’s estimated music market size (Table 7).
The estimated parameter for transitive mediated triads increases steadily from
.26 to 1.66 as the threshold increases. This is not just reassuring but indeed
strengthens the argument that social influence is occurring, because larger trade
flows could be interpreted to exert more influence than small trade flows.
4.3.2 Tests of other models specification choices
Both economic theory and network science provide reasons to suspect that as-
sortativity may be responsible for observed transitive closure. On these data
at least, that suspicion is not justified. I re-estimated models on 15 one year
periods and specified with an out-degree assortativity parameter, but with the
transitivity parameter fixed at zero. Both linear and square root assortativity
specifications were considered. Rao score tests of the null hypothesis that the
parameter for transitive mediated triads is equal to zero (because transitivity is
accounted for by assortative processes) were conducted, and the null hypothesis
was rejected (see Table 8). That is, assortativity cannot explain the level of
transitivity that we observe in the data.
The following paragraphs report a series of additional robustness checks for
which I report the estimate for the transitive mediated triads parameter. All
of these parameter estimates should be compared to 0.26, which was the main
effect reported in Table 5.
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Table 8: Score test of model restricted s.t. transitive mediated triad parameter
is fixed at zero
no assortativity assortativity assortativity1/2
Estimated assortativity β - 0.0005 0.0068
Estimated assortativity s.e. - 31.607 0.0024
Test statistic, c 1291.4 985.9 1372.5
p−value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
To confirm that the choice of 5-year intervals did not unduly influence the
results, I repeated the analysis with lags of three, four, six and seven years. The
parameters from these analyses were all at least as high as the one estimated on
5-year intervals., with parameter estimates for lags of 3, 4, 6, and 7 years equal
to 0.30, 0.28, 0.27, and 0.30, respectively.
Additionally, as mentioned above, it is likely that some countries in the
sample simply do not have the industrial infrastructure to export. So although
social influence through importing may be occurring, we would not see evidence
of it in their exports. To test the robustness of this specification, I also ran a
series of models including only the subset of countries which export to at least
one other country during the study period. I also varied the time lag between
observation years from one to seven years. These models show substantially the
same results as the models with the full sample: including only those with at
least one export market produced a parameter estimate of 0.36.
The set of models run on ties coded according to their absolute, rather than
relative, magnitude also agreed with the main results. After discarding the
smallest trade flows in absolute terms such that their combined total is only 5%
of aggregate music trade, the parameter estimate for transitive mediated triad
creation was 0.28.
The model which omitted the years which may have been subject to the
distorting influence of digital distribution of music recordings produced simi-
lar findings to the full model, with the effect of common influences, distance,
and colonial relationship estimated to have slightly stronger effects than the full
model (transitive mediated triad parameter estimated at 0.35). Digital distri-
bution may indeed have begun to have a real effect on the estimated models by
moving some of the trade outside of the data set, but this distortion does not
substantially affect the conclusions of the analysis. Indeed, the relative size of
the effect is stronger when we omit the years when the data may be distorted
in this way.
4.3.3 Other industries
Chu-Shore (2010) presents a cross-sectional analysis of the network structure
of multiple industries. Perhaps due to the limits of cross-sectional data, Chu-
Shore (2010) drew different conclusions from those in this paper, but they can
be understood complement the present study. As a sort of falsification exer-
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cise, we could imagine what a similar analysis would find if it were conducted
on commodities or purely utilitarian industries in which social influence were
implausible, such as exports of coal, or gear cutters. In those industries, Chu-
Shore found little to no evidence of a transitivity effect. In other goods in which
subjective valuation plays a strong role, such as books and furniture, there was
a strong transitivity effect, lending further support to the argument here.
As one example of such a falsification exercise conducted on longitudinal
data, I repeated the analysis of this paper on trade in coal (specifically An-
thracite, commodity number 3221 in the SITC revision 2 system). As expected,
there was no tendency toward transitive mediated triads: the estimated param-
eter was -0.50 and not significant. Rather than triadic closure, trade in coal is
characterized by hubs. To converge successfully, this model required the addi-
tion of the “out-degree activity” parameter (tendency toward degree dispersion,
which we would expect in an industry driven by comparative advantage due to
natural endowments). The out-degree activity parameter for coal was positive
and significant at 0.51. In contrast, for music data, an added out-degree activity
parameter was estimated at only 0.01 and the estimate for transitive mediated
triads was unchanged at 0.26.
4.3.4 Other network models of international trade
Many other notable network-based studies of international trade have been car-
ried out in recent years (McNerney, Fath, & Silverberg, 2013; Riccaboni & Schi-
avo, 2014; Ward, Ahlquist & Rozenas, 2013), and while most are not directly
relevant to the present results, Bosker and Westbrock (2014) and Chaney (2014)
both provide supply-side reasons to predict triadic closure in international trade
flows. Both papers study aggregate trade (Bosker and Westbrock (2014) does
distinguish between final and intermediate goods), rather than trade in a sin-
gle industry. Setting aside the above evidence (Chu-Shore, 2010) that network
structure depends on the information-intensiveness of the industry, it would be
reassuring to rule out these explanations for transitivity.
Conveniently, the two papers both predict different forms of triadic closure
than the transitive mediated triad I observe in music trade. Bosker and West-
brock’s (2014) model implies closure as follows. Consider country j, which
imports from country i, and assume the existence of country k. Further assume
that country k is geographically close to i and j such that some level of trade is
likely. In order to produce goods for export to j, country i’s demand for interme-
diate goods from country k is expected to increase. In other words, given tie xij ,
they predict the formation or strengthening of tie xki. This would amount to
tendencies toward transitive closure, of the non-”mediated” type (given the ex-
istence xkj) and/or three-cycles (given xjk). If we further assume the existence
of xji (the reciprocal tie to xij), they would also predict transitive mediated
triads. In sum Bosker and Westbrock (2014) predict transitive (non-mediated)
closure, three cycles and possible a combination of reciprocity and transitive
mediated triads.
Chaney (2014) posits a process of trade partner discovery very similar to
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the models of Vazquez (2003) and Sarama¨ki & Kaski (2004), in which trading
partners can be found either at random, or by transitive closure. The actual
direction of the trade flow is not determined by the transitive closure process,
and multiple types of closed triads are consistent with the model. Chaney’s
model would predict the existence of transitive mediated triads, transitive (non-
mediated) triads, and three-cycles.
The model I present here only predicts a significant tendency to transi-
tive mediated triads, and not the other results. Additional robustness checks
indicate no significant tendency to either three-cycles (parameter estimate =
−1.40, s.e. = 0.75) or transitive non-mediated triads (parameter estimate =
0.04, s.e. = 0.12). The results above already indicate a tendency against reci-
procity, providing further evidence against Bosker and Westbrock (2014). These
negative results argue strongly against the supply-side models of Bosker and
Westbrock (2014) and Chaney (2014) in explaining the current results. This is
not surprising, given that those papers study aggregate trade, and these results
in no way call into question the validity of their findings.
5 Discussion
5.1 Summary and interpretation
Consuming foreign products is correlated with the future ability to sell in new
markets — but only in those markets that were also influenced by those same
foreign products. Markets come to have compatible demand for information
goods through exposure to the same social influences: for interpreted informa-
tion goods, between-market trade evolves through a process of transitive closure.
By focusing on triadic structures in the pattern of trade, we can see how
social influence complements homophily in the formation of new markets for a
country’s (or other “home industry’s”) products. Given the highly subjective
and varied nature of music recordings, we can safely assume that all ties in the
network are homophilous. Taste in the importing country has to be compatible
with the music being offered by exporters, or there would be no trade. However,
what homophily cannot explain is how the pattern of trade will change and
which new ties will come into being. A process of social influence predicts triadic
closure by providing common reference points for markets that previously lacked
them. Quite analogously to the everyday experience of individual people, for
markets, common experience increases the probability of new relationships.
5.2 Conclusion
The present study has considered the question of how a local industry for inter-
preted information goods begins to sell their products in a new market, focusing
on whether social influence from outside markets would help or hurt this effort.
The results show strong positive effects of social influence from imports in devel-
oping new export markets, but only in those countries that have experienced the
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same social influences: the pattern of trade in music evolves through a process of
transitive closure. More fundamentally, the results support the conclusion that
the more social influence two markets have in common, the more mutual de-
mand those markets will have for each other’s interpreted goods. Adam Smith’s
(1776) oft-quoted maxim is “the division of labor is limited by the extent of the
market.” In a sense, this research attempted to consider an even more funda-
mental question: what is the extent of the market limited by? The answer from
these data is that for interpreted information goods, the extent of the market
is limited by the amount of social influence in common.
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